



AGE DISCRIMINATION IN TURBULENT TIMES 
Margaret Thornton and Trish Luker* 
Concerns about the ramifications of a rapidly ageing population 
have generally focused on the post-retirement period, with 
limited scholarly attention to the experience of ageism in the 
workplace. Despite a shift in policy against early retirement, 
ʻolder workersʼ — who may be as young as 40 — are 
disproportionately experiencing age discrimination, often 
resulting in joblessness. We argue that in a postmodern 
environment, where the culture of ʻyouthismʼ predominates, the 
workplace is undergoing significant changes. In the new 
knowledge economy, characterised by technological know-
how, flexibility and choice, traditional values such as maturity, 
experience and loyalty have become passé. Drawing on 
Australian complaints and reported decisions of age 
discrimination in the workplace in the context of the 
international literature, we demonstrate the variety of forms 
ageism is taking. We argue that age discrimination legislation 
reflects an outdated modernist paradigm that fails to address 
the experience of older workers. In addition, as part of the 
culture of youthism, work is now being gauged by its capacity 
to create an aesthetic of pleasure.  
Introduction 
A significant demographic landmark is predicted to occur by 2020 when, for 
the first time, there will be more people in the world aged over 65 than under 
five.1 The social and economic consequences of an ageing population are 
dramatic and have attracted considerable attention.2 Social and critical 
gerontology offers an important framework for an interdisciplinary approach 
to ageing. However, research tends to focus on the post-retirement period, 
with attention to health and well-being, social participation and quality of 
life. Important as these issues are, there is scope for greater scholarly 
attention to age discrimination in employment. While there is no official 
consensus, it is the discrimination against those over 40 – especially those 
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over 50 or 60 – that is most pronounced.3 Despite the rhetoric of ‘productive 
ageing’ and attempts to add further segmentation to the life-cycle through 
distinctions such as ‘young-old’ and ‘old-old’,4 age discrimination in 
employment is rife, as we will show. 
While the corollary of an ageing population is an ageing workforce, the 
social policy response to older people remaining in employment has been 
ambivalent. There is a level of social acceptance of ageist attitudes because 
the association of ageing with obsolescence is seen as essential to social 
regeneration: it is generally accepted that older people should ‘move over’ to 
make way for the next generation. During the recession of the 1980s and 
1990s, older workers were encouraged to take ‘early exit’ packages as a way 
of addressing the high level of youth unemployment. The prospect of an 
extended period of retirement, coupled with a level of financial security and 
good health, resulted in the rise of the discourse of active ageing. More 
recently, however, the prospect of a depleted labour force as a result of 
negative population growth, together with economic uncertainty, has 
resulted in policies intended to retain older workers in the workforce. In 
2005, then Australian Prime Minister John Howard called for an end to the 
‘cult of early retirement’.5 Despite this shift in policy, older workers continue 
to be disproportionately affected by joblessness; in particular, ‘re-
employment chances decline with age’.6 The main reason given by 
discouraged job-seekers (aged 15 and over) for abandoning the search for 
work in 2008 was ‘Considered too old by employers’ (49 per cent male and 
50 per cent female).7 
The overt reference to age-based criteria for employment positions was 
commonplace and largely unchallenged until at least the 1980s.8 Despite the 
removal of provisions for compulsory retirement and the introduction of 
legislation prohibiting age discrimination in all jurisdictions, Australia is 
reported to have a lower labour force participation rate for workers aged 55–
64 than many other OECD countries.9 During economic recessions, older 
workers are prime targets for retrenchment or ‘early retirement’. In 2005, the 
Productivity Commission reported that since the 1980s, the most dramatic 
area of job growth has been in part-time work, an area dominated by older 
workers.10 The increase in part-time work, self-employment and ‘semi-
retirement’ among older people serves to mask the function of age 
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discrimination in forcing people out of full-time employment, often leading 
to unexpected financial insecurity and a decline in physical and mental 
health. The phenomenon of under-employment has also crept insidiously 
into the equation. 
The exclusion of older people from the workforce demonstrates the 
entrenched socio-cultural association of certain age proxies with life stages. 
It is also a manifestation of fear and anxiety about the ageing process and 
mortality, resulting in a desire to expel the aged ‘other’. We inhabit a culture 
that extols youth and beauty, or ‘youthism’,11 a factor that has significant 
ramifications for the changing nature of work. Indeed, despite the increase in 
longevity and good health, the culture of youthism has brought about a 
situation where ‘old age seems to be getting younger’.12 While embodiment 
and sexualisation have always been features of work for women, the 
assumed correlation of youth with commercial success is having a 
particularly deleterious impact on older women workers, although few age 
complaints are lodged by women. 
In considering the experience of age discrimination legislation in 
Australia, we will argue that the transition from a modernist industrial 
economy, with its stable and distinctive work ethic, to a post-modern, new 
knowledge economy is one that systematically discriminates against older 
workers and privileges youth. We will suggest that a model of age 
discrimination legislation that is itself predicated on a modernist career path 
of certainty and linearity is bound to be of limited efficacy.  
While the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) (ADA) is of very recent 
vintage, the legislative proscription of age discrimination has existed in state 
jurisdictions since the mid-1980s13 and the territories since the early 1990s.14 
Decisions made by state and territory tribunals demonstrate a similar 
capacity to recognise overt and egregious discrimination in conformity with 
the modernist paradigm, if complainants fall into the category of the ‘young-
old’ who have been arbitrarily prevented from embarking upon a career path. 
Far more problematic are the complaints arising from the other end of the 
employment spectrum. Not only is the burden of proof more onerous, but 
tribunals appear to evince less sympathy for the ‘mature-old’, and even less 
for the ‘old-old’. Despite the aims of age discrimination legislation, 
youthism has taken hold insidiously in the culture of work. 
The research on which this article is based forms part of the ‘EEO in a 
Culture of Uncertainty’ project, which investigates the retreat from equal 
employment opportunity in Australia as a result of the shift from social 
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liberalism to neo-liberalism. Research in this area is fraught with difficulties. 
Compounding the restrictive understanding of age discrimination, legislative 
ambiguity and numerous exceptions, complaint statistics are low15 and there 
are few reported decisions. In addition, the ground of age has received 
limited scholarly attention in Australia.16 Furthermore, discrimination 
complaints can only ever be regarded as the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
actual experience, as there are many reasons why individuals may not lodge 
a formal complaint about discriminatory conduct and, even if they do, why 
they are loathe to proceed to a public hearing if conciliation fails.17 
Fieldwork for the project involved a longitudinal study of employment-
related discrimination, including examination of confidential conciliation 
complaint files held by anti-discrimination agencies in three jurisdictions.18 
Over 330 files were examined, spanning the years 1976–2008, covering all 
grounds of complaint in the area of employment. Our task was complicated 
by the fact that complaints on the ground of age really only became manifest 
in the 1990s, paralleling the neo-liberal swing and the erosion of 
employment conditions. Furthermore, the annual reports of discrimination 
agencies have paid scant attention to the characteristic of age, which has 
made it virtually impossible to make comparisons between agencies or draw 
meaningful conclusions from the limited data. The inferences we draw 
therefore cannot be supported in rigorous quantitative terms, but are largely 
suggestive. We were able to establish, however, that a breakdown of the sex 
and age of complainants indicated that, at least in one jurisdiction, the 
number of complaints received tended to increase with age, with the highest 
proportion emanating from 50–64-year-olds. Complainants alleged that 
discrimination was most often experienced during selection processes, 
although the burden of proof is most onerous at this stage when respondent 
employers have a monopoly over the evidence. 
Work in a Postmodern Frame 
Zygmunt Bauman argues that one feature of the transition from modernity to 
post-modernity is a shift in the meaning of work from that based on a work 
ethic to one concerned with an aesthetic of consumption. During the 
Industrial Revolution, the work ethic functioned primarily to mobilise 
workers to serve the interests of capitalism, but getting the poor and the 
‘voluntarily idle’ to work was also a moral task.19 Bauman shows how the 
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representation of human existence as a coherent and linear life course, 
segmented into age-related stages and conceived in relation to productivity, 
crystallised into the normative model of modernity. The work ethic also 
assumed a central role in the construction of identity. Now the leitmotif of 
postmodernity as consumption, rather than production, is dramatically 
altering not only the nature of work but social attitudes towards it: 
Technological progress has reached the point where productivity 
grows together with the tapering of employment; factory crews get 
leaner and slimmer; ‘downsizing’ is the new principle of 
modernization.20 
The shift from a producer society to a consumer society is reflected in 
the decline of traditional industries such as manufacturing and the rise of the 
new knowledge economy in which technological know-how and innovation 
are central. Industrial decline in the West has led to the premature exit of 
large numbers of older workers.21 Permanent and secure jobs with a 
structured working career are no longer viable.22 ‘Flexibility’ and ‘choice’ 
are the euphemisms that cloak work that is increasingly precarious – short 
term, part time and casual. The revolutionary change in the nature of work is 
rational from the perspective of the employer since we now inhabit what 
Ulrick Beck has famously dubbed the ‘risk society’.23 Globalisation 
illustrates the point: 
if you want to survive in the global capitalistic market, you have to 
change the basic foundations of modernity: social security, the 
nation-state, the power of the unions and so on. The greater the threat, 
the greater the change which has to be undertaken in order to control 
the future.24 
Jobs have vanished with remarkable rapidity. As Bauman percipiently 
notes, their disappearance is cloaked by the language of redundancy, which 
has replaced ‘unemployment’. Less people are needed to produce things: 
‘The present-day streamlined, downsized, capital- and knowledge-intensive 
industry casts labour as a constraint on the rise of productivity.’25 The risks 
that were calculable under industrial society have become incalculable and 
unpredictable in the risk society.26 Thus, if it is deemed economically rational 
to shed high-paid workers for low-paid ‘flexible’ workers, so be it. 
                                                           
20  Bauman (2005), p 24. 
21  Taylor (2001), p 271. 
22  Bauman (2005), p 27. 
23  Beck (1992).  
24  Beck (1998), p 11. 
25  Bauman (2005), p 70. 
26  Beck (1992), p 16. 
146 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2010) VOL 19 NO 2 
 
This cultural shift has had a particularly deleterious effect on mature-
age workers. As Richard Sennett graphically puts it, ‘time’s arrow has been 
broken’; it no longer has a trajectory.27 Commonly, workers in manufacturing 
industries had long histories of service with their employers, accompanied 
by ongoing job security. Now they find themselves the victims of 
downsizing, with little prospect of continuous employment again.28 There is 
no new employer ethic to replace the disintegration of the work ethic.  
The social contract that existed between management and labour was 
mutually beneficial: in return for unstinting loyalty, the employee was 
assured of a job for life. Now a sense of betrayal can be discerned in 
response to the redundancies and restructurings that have ensued from 
corporate collapses and ‘downsizing’. Somewhat ironically, it is the loyal 
and experienced workers, acculturated into the work ethic over a lifetime, 
who are most likely to be targeted for retrenchment.29 In a curious inversion 
of the ‘last-on, first-off’ policy, ageism in the restructured workplace has 
resulted in a ‘first-on, first-off’ policy. Although dismissing the most 
experienced workers appears to be irrational from a business perspective,30 
the negative assumptions made about older workers endlessly circulate so 
that they eventually acquire the status of truth. They are perceived to lack 
both imagination and ambition;31 it is also believed that people become less 
adaptable as they age, and greater costs are associated with retraining them.32  
Instead of being dedicated to the work ethic for life, the postmodern 
worker is expected to be a ‘pliant self, a collage of fragments unceasing in 
its becoming, ever open to new experience’.33 Loyalty and experience, the 
trademarks of the modernist worker, have been transmuted into the negative 
signs of ageing.34 Instead, it is youthfulness for its own sake that is desired.35  
Within post-industrial economies, knowledge and information have 
become the revolutionary commodities that form the basis of the new 
economy.36 As knowledge has replaced land and manufacturing as the 
primary site of contest between nation states, it is the skilled new knowledge 
workers, particularly those in information technology and communications, 
who are prized. It is also assumed that there is a homologous relationship 
between youth and the new technologies, which militates against older 
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workers. Youth are viewed as the paradigmatic pliant workers, who are able 
to enter the postmodern workplace as tabula rasa when the corporate brand 
name can be stamped on their foreheads. Concern about inexperience, 
formerly the sign of an undesirable worker, has receded in the adulation of 
youthism. Within the new knowledge economy, the wisdom conventionally 
associated with age, experience, conscientiousness, loyalty and expertise 
have become passé. Despite the positive qualities possessed by the over-
forties, they are viewed as less compliant, they know too much about their 
organisational seniors and peers — and they are expensive.37 
The disintegration of the work ethic has been accompanied by a 
diminution of the rights of workers and a decrease in trade union 
membership.38 The compact between government, unions and employers, 
through which the terms and conditions of work were negotiated in Australia 
for a century, has been disbanded in favour of deregulation for the good of 
‘the economy’ – that is, in the hope of securing a competitive edge in a 
fickle globalised context. The neo-liberal turn has signalled a revival of the 
privileging of employer prerogative in the interests of profits. The new 
worker nomads are expected to flit from workplace to workplace and 
reinvent themselves according to the demands of the moment, negotiating 
the risks and changing terms of employment along the way.  
It was from this volatile and unpropitious environment that the body 
politic gave birth to age discrimination legislation, to which we now turn. 
A Modernist Response to a Postmodernist Dilemma 
Equality or Functionality? 
The proscription of discrimination on the ground of age joins a catalogue of 
other attributes, including race, sex, disability and sexuality, which have 
incrementally been included in an expanded understanding of human rights 
that emerged and gathered force following World War II. However, the 
economic rationalist imperatives we have adverted to at the outset 
undoubtedly also informed the legislative initiative pertaining to age. First, 
there is the dramatic increase in the proportion of older people in our society 
and the additional cost of maintaining them, particularly if they lack 
superannuation due to an erratic work history. Second, a large cohort of 
able-bodied people who are unproductive does not fit well with the 
prevailing neo-liberal commitment to productivity, performativity and 
functionality. The emphasis on productivity is redolent of the Protestant 
work ethic of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with its equation of 
immorality with idleness. Indeed, it has been estimated that Australia ‘loses’ 
$10.8 billion per year in failing to utilise the skills and experience of older 
people.39 As in the United States and Britain, the view that the overall supply 
                                                           
37  Glover and Branine (2001), p 9. 
38  In 1986, 46 per cent of Australian employees were trade union members, but by 2007 this 
had declined to 19 per cent: ABS (2008), p 131.  
39  National Seniors Productive Ageing Centre (2009), p 11. 
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of labour needs to be increased has encouraged governments to look to older 
workers once again.40 The argument in favour of more work collides head-on 
with the populist view that less work for older workers is the solution, and it 
is legitimate to target them for redundancy and downsizing. Such views have 
tipped the balance towards the conceptualisation of age discrimination as ‘an 
economic labour market issue rather than an equality issue’.41  
Unlike the US Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 (ADEA), 
which is restricted to employment and those over 40, age discrimination in 
Australia is generally proscribed in a range of areas, including education, 
access to goods and services, and accommodation, as well as employment.42 
Also, there is no minimum or maximum age limit, and mandatory retirement 
has been abolished, as in the United States. We are concerned with older 
workers, but reiterate that the designation ‘too old’ may also apply to those 
under 40, particularly when the focus is on youth and beauty. The ‘young-
old’ may be able to make out a complaint of discrimination on the ground of 
age successfully, as we will show, especially when they are seeking to enter 
a career. The ‘mature-old’ may lodge complaints following their enforced 
exit from the workplace or their attempt to re-enter it, whereas the ‘old-old’ 
are more likely to abandon their job search altogether. 
When omnibus anti-discrimination legislation initially was enacted in 
Australia in the 1970s, the idea of including age as a proscribed ground was 
greeted with scepticism because chronological age had long been accepted 
as a legitimate determinant of differential treatment. Even with the ADA, 
age had to be the dominant reason for the discrimination originally, although 
this was changed in 2009.43 The intersection of age with sex, race or 
disability has meant that age is frequently subsumed within one of these 
grounds and becomes invisible.44 The intersection of age and sex 
disproportionately impacts on older women, but there are comparatively few 
complaints lodged by this cohort. The majority of age discrimination 
complainants are likely to be white men in their fifties who belong to the 
‘professional/managerial’ class.45 However, critical gerontology shows that 
                                                           
40  Macnicol (2006), p 255; Fredman (2003), p 22. 
41  O’Cinneide (2003), p 199. 
42  For an overview of comparative European perspectives, see O’Cinneide (2003). 
43  ADA, s 16.  
44  In Tanevski v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd, a 61-year-old Macedonian-born rail maintenance 
worker was removed from his position because there was concern about the impact of his 
low English literacy level for health and safety requirements. The complainant had 
managed to perform his job well for 40 years and evidence was given by co-workers that 
he was safety conscious: (2008) EOC ¶93-505 (NSWADT). The tribunal rejected the 
claim of age discrimination and direct race discrimination. The respondent appealed the 
finding of indirect race discrimination, which was remitted for redetermination: Fluor 
Australia Pty Ltd v Tanevski (EOD) [2009] NSWADTAP 39. See also Serewko v State of 
Queensland & Elmes: (2009) EOC ¶93-530 (QADT).  
45  Friedman (2003), p 182. See also Encel and Ranzijn (2007), pp 143, 155. According to 
data obtained from the Human Rights Commission, since the ADA commenced operation 
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age is often the third variable in a triad: sex + class + age, or race + class + 
age, although class has even less visibility than age – as it is not a proscribed 
ground in any of the legislation.46 
Competing Rationalities 
Legislative exemptions in the case of age discrimination are generally more 
numerous than other grounds,47 reflecting the rationality of many age-related 
distinctions. Sargeant suggests, in the case of the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006 (UK), that such exceptions have the effect of legitimising, 
rather than addressing, age discrimination.48 In the case of the ADA, the most 
significant exemption in relation to employment relates to the inability of a 
person to carry out the inherent requirements of a job.49 What constitutes an 
inherent requirement of a job – that is, what is essential to its performance 
and what is merely incidental – is highly contestable. Concern about public 
safety is a factor that has legitimised mandatory retirement for workers such 
as airline pilots.  
The question of whether operational requirements and administrative 
convenience are also inherent requirements lay at the heart of the leading 
High Court decision of Qantas Airlines v Christie,50 a case that arose under 
the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), s 170DF, which rendered 
termination unlawful on the basis of age. A majority of the court upheld the 
argument of the respondent, Qantas Airways, that to be aged under 60 was 
an inherent requirement of the job of piloting international passenger aircraft 
on long-haul flights, as some countries prohibited flying above that age. The 
absurdity that resulted, however, was that although the complainant was 
deemed to possess the requisite skills, knowledge and experience to fly 
jumbo jets internationally from Australia to Indonesia, Fiji and New 
Zealand, he lacked the skills, knowledge and experience to fly them 
anywhere else. Qantas claimed that there were insufficient short-haul routes 
to make up the rosters for the complainant and other pilots. The broadening 
of the inherent requirements of the job to include operational requirements 
and administrative convenience in this way is always going to skew the 
outcome in the interests of employers.51 
                                                                                                                              
in 2004, significantly more complaints have been received from men than women 
annually, and complainants are clustered in the 45–64-year age group (all grounds). For 
example, during 2005, 52 complaints were received from men and 25 from women, and 
49 per cent of complainants were in the 45–64-year age group (data on file with authors). 
46  The nexus between poverty and enforced unemployment due to age was observed in a 
government report in Australia more than three decades ago: Commission of Inquiry into 
Poverty (1975), p 236. 
47  Encel (2004); Easteal et al (2007), p 99. 
48  Sargeant (2006).  
49  ADA, s 18(4); cf DDA, s 21A. 
50  Qantas Airlines v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280. 
51  Thornton (2009).  
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As age discrimination legislation is replete with contradictions, it is 
uncertain just what role it is meant to serve.52 There are clearly human rights 
and ethical questions about being forced out of the workforce prematurely. 
However, a right to employment has never been legally recognised in the 
Anglo-Australian legal system, despite ratification of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.53 Indeed, what sense 
would there be in recognising such a ‘right’ in the face of downsizing and 
restructuring, which are viewed as bona fide business responses to financial 
pressure?54 The policy questions about ‘making way’ for a new generation of 
workers has also weighed heavily with decision-makers. On the other hand, 
should older workers be forced to ‘work ’til they drop’?  
The Insuperable Probative Bar 
All Australian anti-discrimination legislation is based on the individual 
complaint-based model; it imposes no obligation on employers to engage in 
positive measures.55 An individual bears the onus of lodging a complaint 
with a federal, territory or state agency, which then endeavours to conciliate 
it. Very few age complaints proceed to a formal hearing, despite the 
comparatively low rates of conciliation.56 By this stage, the agency has 
sloughed off responsibility for the complaint, and the aggrieved individual 
must assume responsibility for carriage of litigation, which includes proving 
that an identifiable respondent caused the discriminatory harm. This is a 
weighty burden because, while one would expect that the applicable 
standard would be the normal civil standard – on the balance of probabilities 
– it has been subtly elevated to that of the ‘reasonable satisfaction’ of the 
court because of what is perceived to be the moral odium associated with 
naming someone ‘a discriminator’.57 This test, developed by Dixon J in 
Briginshaw v Briginshaw,58 arguably has become the accepted test within the 
                                                           
52  A similar observation has been made in respect of the ADEA. See Macnicol (2006), 
p 266. 
53  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 
16 December 1966, entered into force in Australia 10 March 1976). Article 6(1) 
recognises the right to work. 
54  Skinner & Smith v Lightning Bolt (2001) EOC ¶93-167 (QADT); Easteal et al (2007), 
pp 104–5. 
55  A recent study has recommended that affirmative action strategies, such as those 
contained in the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) should be 
devised for older workers. See National Seniors Productive Ageing Centre (2009).  
56  Easteal et al (2007), pp 101–2. During 2008–09, 43 per cent of complaints made under the 
ADA were resolved through conciliation: HREOC (2009), p 80. In the five years since the 
ADA came into force, there have been only a limited number of formal hearings and no 
successful claims. 
57  Gaze (2002), p 335. 
58  Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 
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jurisdiction generally,59 although the stricter test was devised in the context 
of race and sex, not age discrimination.60 
While competing rationalities beset all discrimination complaints, they 
serve to raise the probative bar even higher in respect of age discrimination. 
As intimated, restructuring and downsizing have become everyday 
occurrences, which mean that a respondent is invariably going to be able to 
rationalise its actions, including dismissal. The adduction of evidence 
regarding the impact of the global economic crisis, for example, could be 
sufficient to absolve the respondent. Thus, unless the conduct is egregious, 
proof of age discrimination is exceedingly difficult in the absence of a 
reverse onus. Lawrence Friedman attests to this by reference to US case law, 
where individuals have been dismissed after extensive periods of service and 
the employer has alleged incompetence.61 As an unsuccessful complainant 
could be faced with the respondent’s costs as well as their own, the slim 
chance of success represents a significant disincentive for persevering with a 
complaint. 
Also compounding the burden of proof is the volatility of work. As with 
anti-discrimination legislation generally, age discrimination legislation is 
based on the modernist work ethic of full-time stable employment. The 
traditional employment contract takes insufficient cognisance of precarious 
or redundant workers. In the new boundaryless workplace, authority is 
diffused, hierarchy is flattened and there may be no clear criteria for 
advancement.62 Not only do informality and deregulation encourage covert 
discrimination, but precarious workers – including those whose work has 
been outsourced – may be prevented from lodging a complaint because there 
is no obvious suable entity. In any case, there may be little point in pursuing 
a complaint when effort has to be expended on the next job search, which 
may involve reinventing oneself as a savvy new knowledge worker. 
Given the entrenched belief that age is an accurate predictor of 
intellectual and physical capacity, the evidence suggests that discrimination 
legislation is likely to exert little influence on how employers hire and fire.63 
In the absence of significant damages awards, incentives or penalties, the 
present legislative schema is unlikely to do very much to effect social 
change. While highly critical of the ADEA, Richard Posner acknowledges 
that it did eventually encourage employers to move beyond the 
chronological approach to age, but it took some time for the message to filter 
down to them.64 While the United States does have a 40-year history of age 
                                                           
59  De Plevitz (2003); Hunyor (2003).  
60  The Briginshaw test was rejected in an age discrimination complaint by Harbison J in a 
hearing before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). See Morgan v 
Austin Health (Anti-Discrimination) [2007] VCAT 2229.  
61  Friedman (2003), pp 184–6. Cf Goodworth v Marsdens Motory Pty Ltd [1996] NSWEOT 
(Unreported, 4 January 1996); Choong v Bridgestone Australia Ltd [2009] SAEOT 8. 
62  Fudge and Owens (2006); Stone (2004); Pocock (2003).  
63  Patterson (2004); Walt (2004). 
64  Posner (1995), p 335. 
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discrimination legislation, the corrosion of the work ethic has served to 
undermine this experience. 
The Arbitrariness of Age as a Proxy 
Paradoxically, the introduction of legislative proscriptions against age 
discrimination has occurred at the same time as an increasing level of 
uncertainty about the meaning of age. The modernist framework of age 
discrimination legislation reflects an understanding of age as an identifiable 
characteristic not unlike other grounds of sex, race or disability. The 
meaning of age in modernity is stabilised via its normative function in 
regulating social and economic relations, such that ‘functional age becomes 
transformed into social age, and social ages into age distinctions’.65 Age 
distinctions are established on the basis of physiology and cognitive skill 
which are subsequently translated into characteristics such as maturity or 
ability.66  
While it is undoubtedly true that the long-term ageing process involves 
a level of physiological deterioration, this varies considerably between 
individuals. In addition, age is not ahistorical, for it acquires markedly 
different meanings across social and cultural contexts. There is ample 
evidence which demonstrates that the longevity resulting from 
improvements in health and diet in the West means that the physical and 
intellectual decline associated with age is occurring later in life. There is as 
much variation between individuals of the same age as there is between 
ages, such that biological age, rather than chronological age, is suggested by 
some as a more appropriate measure.67 
 Despite its uncertainty, age is often used as a proxy for health and 
fitness in recruitment processes for areas such as the police and military 
services, where physical performance is considered paramount. Rather than 
assess applicants individually, age limits are assumed to provide the 
requisite filtering mechanism for eligibility to a wide range of positions. In 
this context, arbitrary age limits function as a proxy for physical fitness, 
which is equated with youth. Moreover, age proxies serve the administrative 
purpose of efficiency, therefore making individual assessment of applicants 
unnecessary. It may be impossible to enter these fields after an age as young 
as 28, which was the case until relatively recently, as we will go on to 
discuss. 
Shortly prior to the introduction of the ADA, the use of age as a proxy 
for assessment of physical ability was challenged successfully in a series of 
complaints lodged with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (HREOC) under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) involving the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 
Although not unlawful, age discrimination was one of a number of grounds 
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introduced under the HREOC Act from 1990, which allowed the 
investigation and conciliation of complaints. These cases represent striking 
illustrations of the notion of the ‘young-old’ phenomenon in which 
employers set up arbitrary age limits as proxies for physical and medical 
fitness that operate both to exclude entry to an occupation and to inhibit 
promotion.  
Initial complaints were made by three prospective entrants and one 
serving member of the ADF,68 an organisation that represents a paradigm of 
the linear career path of the modernist work ethic. The ADF maintained age 
limits for applicants to various positions, irrespective of the individual’s 
medical fitness or previous experience. The outcome of the complaints 
hinged on whether the exclusion on the basis on age could be established as 
an inherent requirement of the job. Finding in favour of the complainants, 
Sidoti C adopted a narrow construction of the ‘inherent requirement’ on the 
basis that ‘exemptions to human rights provisions should be interpreted 
narrowly’.69 He found no direct correlation between a person’s age and 
medical fitness, for applicants should be assessed individually rather than 
through the arbitrary use of age proxies. He also found that return on 
investment, while a relevant consideration, should not be the rationale for 
making age an inherent requirement of a job.70 This cluster of ADF cases 
involved such blatant manifestations of ageism that they could not be 
sustained.  
One complainant, a 35-year-old man, had applied for a position as an 
administrative officer with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) but was 
rejected as ‘too old’. The RAAF used an age criterion for direct entry 
officers of 17 to 35 years on the grounds that it was necessary to maintain a 
‘fit, vigorous and youthful force capable of effective engagement in combat 
operations’. Evidence was given that as a result of a reduction in the size of 
the ADF, all members – even those principally engaged in an administrative 
and human resource management role – were required to meet medical and 
fitness standards sufficient to ‘cope with the privations of the battlefield’.71 
Notably, there was a degree of flexibility in relation to recruitment of 
specialist service officers, such as doctors, lawyers, dentists and other 
professionals. (The role of education in enhancing employment prospects 
                                                           
68  Bradley, Barty, Peterson and Van Den Heuvel; the ADF conceded discrimination in 
relation to the latter. See HREOC 2000b). 
69  HREOC (2000b), p 8. In coming to this decision, Sidoti C drew in particular on the 
decision of Gray J in Christie v Qantas Airways Ltd (1996) 138 ALR 17, arguing that it, 
rather than the decision in Commonwealth of Australia v Human Rights and Equal 
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Christie (discussed above) or X v Commonwealth (1999) 167 ALR 529. 
71  HREOC (2000b), p 36. 
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and prolonging working life is well known.)72 Commissioner Sidoti accepted 
that possession of a level of fitness sufficient for ground combat operations 
was an inherent requirement of the job, but he referred to medical and fitness 
tests as the appropriate measure and recommended removal of the upper age 
limit in the selection criteria for the position.73 
Another complainant, a 37-year-old helicopter pilot with considerable 
flying and training experience who had been trained by ex-Australian Army 
helicopter pilots, was denied the opportunity to apply to the Specialist 
Service Officer Pilot Scheme because he also was ‘too old’. He did not 
comply with the requirement that eligible applicants be between 19 and 28 
years. The respondent sought judicial review of the HREOC decision that 
favoured the complainant, arguing that the upper age limit was set to enable 
career progression and because younger trainees were more adaptable to 
learning.74 The ADF argued that combat flying was ‘a young person’s game’ 
that required a high level of physical and mental fitness, and there was a 
‘direct correlation between the age of pilots and their ability to safely and 
effectively perform in a combat flying environment’.75 Moreover, it argued 
that the age criterion was necessary to ensure a return on investment because 
of the greater likelihood of an older trainee developing a disqualifying 
condition.76 However, Wilcox J found that the critical factor was not age, but 
the possession of the required fitness. The Commonwealth appealed to the 
Full Court, but the decision was upheld unanimously. Black CJ found the 
respondent’s argument that there was a ‘logical link’ between age and fitness 
would ultimately defeat the purpose of the legislation. 
In these cases, age proxies functioned insidiously to police the 
boundaries of a potential labour force by privileging youth as the overriding 
determinant. Youthfulness is attractive to an employer because it facilitates 
the grooming of compliant and obedient subjects, essential to the ‘military 
industrial complex’. 
A second group of age discrimination complaints involving the ADF 
related to the non-promotion of officers because of their age, when 55 was 
the compulsory retirement age.77 The logic of the ‘young-old’ bar is 
                                                           
72  For example, Encel and Ranzijn (2007), p 145. Posner illustrates the point clearly with 
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73  Similar arguments were made in relation to the complaint of Petersen, a 43-year-old who 
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158 ALR 468 at 472. 
76  HREOC (2000b), p 28. 
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perplexing in the context of promotion, but reveals how deep-seated is the 
antipathy towards those who do not conform to prevailing age norms in the 
modernist career model. Andrew Hamilton was a 47-year-old Lieutenant 
Commander in the Navy, who sought promotion to the position of 
Commander.78 When he was unsuccessful, he was relegated to Band D, 
which meant that he was deemed to be less competitive for the next round 
because of the length of time he had remaining in the service. The ADF 
unsuccessfully sought to argue that the potential of an officer to progress to a 
higher rank is a distinction or preference based on the inherent requirements 
of the job because of organisational and operational requirements. Sidoti C 
found that the potential to progress to the next rank and beyond was not an 
inherent requirement of the job of commander. While it could not be 
categorically determined that the complainant would in fact have been 
promoted, it was his opportunity to be promoted that was nullified. The 
Commonwealth applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the 
decision, but Katz J rejected its submissions.79 Not only did the evidence 
reveal that the complainant was automatically disqualified from promotion 
by treating the age requirement as inherent, but the evidence also revealed 
that no lieutenant-commander with less than four years to serve before 
compulsory requirement had ever been promoted to commander.80 
Hamilton and several similar cases81 clearly comport with the traditional 
work ethic, a factor that undoubtedly contributed to the impetus for 
enactment of the ADA. At the time, concern about the economic and social 
consequences of an ageing society on the demographic of the workforce 
resulted in a series of inquiries into age discrimination, particularly as 
experienced by mature-age workers.82 We now turn to consider how effective 
the legislation has been in addressing pervasive levels of age discrimination, 
such as the loss of employment in a context where the work ethic has 
evaporated. 
                                                                                                                              
www.defencejobs.gov.au/recruitmentCentre/supportAndDownloads/’FAQs/Commitment/
#Whendoyouhavetoretire (12 November 2009). 
78  HREOC (2002). 
79  Commonwealth of Australia v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission & 
Andrew Hamilton [2000] FCA 1854. 
80  Commonwealth of Australia v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission & 
Andrew Hamilton [2000] FCA 1854 [67]. 
81  HREOC (2005). 
82  House of Representatives, Standing Committee on Employment, Education and 
Workplace Relations (2000); HREOC (2000b); Victorian, South Australian and Western 
Australian Equal Opportunity Commissions and the Australian Employers Convention 
(2001).  
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Ageing Actively in an Uncertain World 
Too Old to Work 
The assumed association of ageing with decreasing physical capacity can 
result in a pathological construction that equates age with disability and/or 
illness, and youth with health and ability, as illustrated by the ADF 
complaints. Notwithstanding the promotion of policies intended to 
encourage mature-age workers to remain in the workforce longer, to 
‘reinvent’ themselves through the pursuit of multiple careers and to remain 
fit and healthy, older workers are disproportionately suffering because the 
skills and experience acquired at an earlier time are less relevant to the new 
workplace. In this way, the demeaning label of being ‘made redundant’ has 
had particular salience for workers who may not be sufficiently pliant for the 
new economy. Mature-age workers who are made redundant often drift out 
of the workforce, particularly if they subsequently experience a prolonged 
period of unemployment.83  
The labour force non-participation rates of older workers increased 
significantly during the late 1980s and early 1990s in Australia, facilitated 
by financial incentives that particularly advantaged men who had been in 
long-term, full-time employment and who therefore had access to 
superannuation.84 The concept of retirement from work, unheard of prior to 
mass industrialisation, emerged as a social policy response to regulation of 
the labour force. The age pension was introduced in Australia in the early 
1900s as a central platform of the welfare state,85 clearly signalling 
assumptions about age and productivity. The introduction of compulsory 
superannuation in the 1990s,86 which functioned as part of a move to neo-
liberal economic policies, signified a scaling down of state support for the 
aged, shifting responsibility to the individual. 
Compulsory retirement, once a standard feature of the employment 
contract, has largely been abolished, although this has occurred 
inconsistently across jurisdictions during which time it has been the subject 
of a number of complaints.87 In Lorang v Mater Misericordiae Hospital,88 the 
NSW Court of Appeal upheld a decision allowing a hospital to terminate the 
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85  Invalid and Old Age Pensions Act 1908 (Cth). 
86  Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).  
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appointment of a Visiting Medical Specialist anaesthetist on his 65th 
birthday because he was found not to be an employee. Gleeson CJ and 
Clarke JA found that the complainant had not been forced to retire, but 
rather had been denied accreditation and the use of premises and facilities, 
which was therefore not contrary to the ADA (NSW). Dissenting, Kirby P 
was dismissive of what he construed to be narrow legalism. He highlighted 
specific references in the hospital’s by-laws to the requirement of 
‘retirement’ at age 65, and pointed out that it was unrealistic to suggest that 
an anaesthetist could continue to practise an occupation outside a hospital.89 
Kirby P found that there was ample evidence to support the tribunal’s 
decision that the respondent’s purpose was to cause the complainant to 
retire, including a letter in which it wished him ‘a long and happy 
retirement’. However, in Ivory v Griffith University,90 an academic staff 
member who had worked for the university for nearly 20 years successfully 
challenged his employer’s insistence on maintaining the term of his original 
contract, which specified that his position would terminate at 65 years, 
despite the abolition of compulsory retirement in 1994. The complainant 
‘felt resentful and outraged at this attempt to put him in a shameful category 
of “second rate” and devalued citizens who were “too old” to make a useful 
contribution to their employment’.91 In Ivory, it was more difficult to adduce 
a rational explanation for age discrimination than in Lorang. 
There is evidence that coercive retirement is commonplace and that 
various measures are used to push productive workers out of the workforce. 
In one complaint file, a 63-year-old managing director of a manufacturing 
company was advised that it was company policy to retire staff at 60 because 
‘the city and stock market prefer it’.92 Another concerned a 62-year-old retail 
fashion store manager who was eventually demoted with a salary cut on the 
grounds that ‘she looked stressed’.93 The first sign of disability in an older 
worker may trigger coercive retirement on the basis that the age of the 
person will preclude full recovery. A 60-year-old man who had worked as a 
forklift operator, picker and packer for a construction company for 22 years 
was informed that his position was terminated on the grounds that he could 
not perform the inherent requirements of the job due to workplace injuries.94 
In Mooney v Commissioner of Police, a 65-year-old police officer alleged 
that he was pressured to resign because his disabilities meant he needed to 
take substantial amounts of sick leave.95 
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It is difficult for a worker anywhere near the traditional age of 
retirement to challenge an employer when subjected to less favourable 
treatment.96 Such workers often slip out of the workforce and do not appear 
in unemployment statistics. While compulsory retirement no longer exists, 
the age of 65 remains a silent referent for retirement or work reduction, such 
that it appears to be difficult to argue a claim of age discrimination if one is 
older. In Morgan v Austin Health,97 a 71-year-old medical specialist who had 
been allocated fewer sessions subsequent to a restructure was unsuccessful 
in a claim of age discrimination. Even if the complainant were able to 
establish that the respondent was animated by age discrimination, he also 
had to establish strict comparability according to the High Court ruling in 
Purvis.98 That is, he had to show less favourable treatment than someone of a 
younger age who had been allocated the same number of sessions originally, 
but was not subjected to any reduction. As the complainant’s original 
allocation arose from his considerable expertise and reputation in the field, 
the possibility of finding a similarly situated young comparator (real or 
hypothetical) reveals how restrictive the direct discrimination requirement is 
in the context of age.99 
Reinventing the Self 
The concept of retirement has itself been unhinged by the rhetoric of 
flexibility, resulting in the promotion of policies that blur the boundaries 
between work and retirement, functioning in the interests of the neo-liberal 
workplace. Current policies include measures intended to keep older workers 
working in some capacity and contributing to superannuation, thus 
forestalling entitlement for welfare benefits.100 The rhetoric of ageing actively 
and productively by remaining in the workforce is seductive when the 
alternative may be 25-plus years of retirement, with diminished social status 
and income. However, the bottom line for flexible work practices is the 
commercial interests of the employer: the attempt to entice workers to 
remain in the workforce longer is a response to concern about labour 
shortages as a result of earlier policies that encouraged workers to leave 
when labour markets contracted during the 1980s. As Philip Taylor points 
out, ‘offering the “right” of older people to work when there is no work to be 
had due to age discrimination, a lack of skills currency, or failing health may 
simply be condemning many to “active” ageing in the form of labour force 
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participation, but with little or no prospect of meaningful job 
opportunities’.101 
The academic literature supports the view that older workers receive 
substantially less training than younger workers,102 which is borne out by our 
research. In a complaint made in 2006, a 50-year-old technician who had 
been employed in a chemical company for 21 years was unsuccessful in his 
application for a promotional position because he was advised that the 
company was looking for a ‘20 plus’ return on its investment.103 The 
complainant claimed that he was already familiar with at least 60 per cent of 
the tasks necessary for the position, but it was offered to a 25-year-old 
bricklayer with no chemical industry experience. Similarly, in Richards v 
Webforge Australia Pty Ltd,104 a 60-year-old stock controller, after working 
for his employer for 23 years, was offered a redundancy overnight because 
he was considered too old to train for an expanded role in the company. The 
respondent gave evidence that the training necessary for the new processes 
of supply chain management would take some years, and the company 
would not be able to recover on its investment. The complainant denied that 
he was unprepared to undergo further training.105 Given that the complainants 
in both these cases had already devoted over 20 years of their working lives 
to their employers, the companies’ refusal to support their access to training 
and promotional opportunities is at odds with the stated commitment to 
invest in the labour force. 
In Queensland, a respondent retail company argued that it had not 
dismissed two storemen because of their age, but because they were not 
sufficiently ambitious.106 The complainants, both in their late fifties, were 
dismissed after only three months, despite being skilled and experienced. 
The respondent argued that this was as a result of a downturn in trade due to 
the loss of a major customer. However, one week later it employed two 
younger men to do the same work. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s 
decision that the complaints were substantiated. The respondent 
acknowledged that the belief that younger storemen would be easier to train 
and could be also employed as sales representatives had influenced its 
decision to appoint the new staff. This is one of the few age discrimination 
complaints involving mature-age workers to succeed at a formal hearing. 
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The Double Paradox of Sex and Age Discrimination 
The consequences of ageing for older women are profound, for it is likely to 
compound their already tenuous hold on employment. Women dominate in 
areas with high levels of insecurity, such as in the service and retail sectors, 
and their employment becomes less secure as they age.107 This was 
demonstrated in a complaint involving a 47-year-old woman who was a 
casual register operator at a large hardware retailer. The complainant said 
that she had been denied weekend and public holiday shifts, resulting in lost 
income; when she complained, she was informed by her manager that she 
cost the company too much because of her age and the fact that she was 
casual.108 Another woman, in her forties, who had been employed as a 
bookkeeper, paymistress and office manager with a small manufacturing 
company for over 10 years was offered a pay increase of 50 cents per hour 
when all other workers were offered two dollars; she was the only female 
employee out of 32 workers. When the complainant took annual leave, her 
manager replaced her with someone else at a higher salary, and advised her 
that she should seek medical assistance for the ‘hormonal problems’ he 
claimed she was experiencing.109 The pathologising of women as ‘hysterics’ 
has a long history in Western culture, and is repeatedly deployed as a 
rationale for excluding women from employment.110 
The intersection of age with sex in the manifestation of discrimination 
not only functions to prevent women from obtaining secure employment, it 
also excludes them from positions of authority to a greater extent than men. 
This is demonstrated in a complaint made by a 53-year-old woman who had 
worked as a teacher in the Catholic primary school system for approximately 
30 years. She unsuccessfully applied for a position as acting religious 
education coordinator and was informed that, while she had been impressive 
in the interview, they had offered the position to another candidate because it 
was believed that the church was in need of young men.111  
The conjunction of sex and age to exclude women from positions of 
seniority was also demonstrated in a complaint made by a female bus driver 
about a shift allocation policy. In the company, there were three categories 
of workers: permanent full-time; permanent part-time; and casual. Seniority 
was based on years of service and the longer employees worked with the 
company, the better the opportunity of obtaining shifts that suited their 
lifestyle. However, if a driver moved between these categories, seniority was 
lost. The complainant, whose position was permanent part-time, required a 
shift that ended at 2.30 pm because she had school-age children, but she was 
prevented from obtaining it because she did not have the requisite level of 
seniority. The shift system, while superficially fair, worked to preclude 
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women who took maternity leave and had parenting responsibilities from 
ever acquiring seniority. 
The intersection of age with sex compounds the invisibility of women 
workers who are already obscured by marginalisation as a result of their 
peripheral status. Women predominate in areas where longevity in 
employment is not valued, such as the service industry, or where there is an 
emphasis on youth and beauty. Ageing is often a site of fear and abjection 
for women, and age discrimination is more difficult to challenge because of 
the social devaluing of the older woman. In Thompson v Big Bert,112 a 37-
year-old woman who had worked as a casual bar attendant for six years 
unexpectedly lost her regular shift arrangements and quantity of work after 
she allegedly overheard the owner of the hotel remark that he wanted to 
replace some of the older workers with ‘young glamours’. She preferred her 
regular day shifts because they complemented her childcare arrangements 
and believed that the change was an attempt to force her to resign. Evidence 
was presented in which the owner of the hotel had reported that some of the 
staff were ‘tired in appearance and attitudes’, and that new professional staff 
were required, but the complainant was unsuccessful in making her case. 
As mentioned earlier, comparatively few age discrimination complaints 
are lodged by women. Not only is age rendered invisible by virtue of 
intersection with the feminine, but discrimination against older women is 
normalised so that they rarely think it is worthwhile to pursue a complaint. 
Our culture discourages women from assuming the persona of the ‘old 
woman’, a subject position associated with abjection. However, as the ADF 
cases showed in the case of men, and we will go on to show in a different 
context, the ‘young-old’ are likely to be more assertive and have a greater 
chance of having their claims upheld. 
The Elixir of Youth 
Despite the legislative prohibition, job-seekers continue to encounter overt 
references to age in job advertisements. A complainant who was interested 
in applying for a position as a salesperson was discouraged by an 
advertisement that stated applicants should be female, in their thirties and 
have ‘outgoing and motivated personalities’.113 Another complaint was 
received in response to an advertisement for casual retail staff over the 
Christmas period, which specified a preference for 18–40-year-olds.114 A 
study by Lynne Bennington showed how job advertisements can be aimed at 
those in their early twenties without specifying age, by the use of words such 
as ‘“buzzy”, “fast-paced”, “go-getter”, “high-flyer”, “can-do”, “switched-
on”, “on-the-ball”, “recent graduate”, “at least 2 years experience,’” and so 
on.115 
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During selection processes, age may be a determining factor, although 
it can readily be obscured by business case rationales. This is illustrated by 
the case of a woman who, having been offered a position as guest service 
agent with an airline, resigned from her permanent position and spent two 
weeks engaged in training. However, when the new business operation was 
not implemented, she and four other trainees were informed that they were 
not required. The complainant alleged that all trainees who remained were 
20–30-year-olds and those who were dismissed were aged over 30.116 The 
preference for women under 30, particularly in areas of sales and service, is 
a typical manifestation of age discrimination. 
The insistence on youthism is relentless. In New South Wales, the 
Equal Opportunity Tribunal found in favour of a complainant who sought 
employment as an airline pilot with Qantas and alleged discrimination in a 
selection process that established a list of potential candidates for future 
recruitment.117 The application process was staged, with the first phase 
involving allocation of a ranking according to flying experience, education 
and age, with decreasing points as age increased. As the applicant was over 
32 at the time he applied, he was assigned a low ranking for age. Echoing 
one of the arguments of the ADF, the respondent maintained that the 
rationale for the inclusion of age as an element of the selection process was 
based on the need to recoup the cost of training, and that the recruitment of 
older pilots did not justify the costs involved in training them. This argument 
was supported by expert evidence that ‘a preference for younger trainees is 
properly and reasonably explained as a rational economic strategy’.118 
However, the Tribunal rejected this argument, pointing out that it was 
concerned with the principles of equal opportunity, not economic 
rationalism, which is not enshrined in legislation and does not form a basis 
for exception under the Act. 
Employers’ preference for younger workers may also be demonstrated 
in the failure to promote more experienced staff. This was discovered by two 
complainants with approximately 25 years’ experience in the hospitality 
industry who claimed that while younger staff had been given greater 
responsibility and salary increases, they had actually been demoted.119 The 
traditional notion of a linear life course with correspondence between work 
and life stages is fragmented by insecure employment and diversified 
organisational structures. When mature age is combined with temporary 
status, this is likely to function as a disadvantage when seeking more secure 
employment, including in the public sector. In Kennedy v Director General, 
NSW Department of Industrial Relations,120 an operator at an industrial award 
inquiry centre complained that when a shortage of funds necessitated 
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staffing cuts, it was the older temporary staff, aged between 39 and 43, 
whose hours were cut or who were placed on the bottom of the eligibility 
list. The complainant had first been employed on a four-month contract, 
which was subsequently renewed 14 times over five and half years; it was 
terminated after he lodged internal grievances. The tribunal acknowledged 
the ‘onerous task’ of establishing that age played a role in a selection 
process, but rejected the claim, although it found that victimisation had 
occurred.  
The facts of this complaint, with its multiple short-term contracts 
undertaken with the very government department responsible for workplace 
standards, underscore the precarious nature of work in the new economy and 
the difficulty of pursuing an age discrimination complaint when career paths 
have disappeared. In a study of workforce ageing in the information 
technology (IT) industry across a number of Western industrial countries, 
researchers found that the normative age-based career trajectory in small to 
medium-sized IT businesses ‘compress careers and define “experience” in 
terms of possessing marketable skills rather than seniority and so are 
complicit in setting early-retirement norms’.121 During 2009, a reported 
increase in unemployment among mature-age IT workers was attributed to 
age discrimination and concern about skills currency.122 
Silicon Valley may be the perfect site for development of Bauman’s 
thesis in relation to age. However, there are other industries where career 
trajectories are compressed into the twenties and thirties, such as the 
commercial graphic design industry. In Retallick v Nestlé Australia,123 an 
unemployed graphic designer who had two tertiary qualifications and 
experience in both web and print design met with a senior member of staff at 
Nestlé to discuss work prospects. After being asked a direct question about 
his age (he is described as ‘starting a new career late in life’),124 he was 
informed of a normal progression for graphic designers where ‘at 24 you are 
a master of your skills, at 26 you are a mid-weight graphic designer, at 28 
you are creative director and at 30 you are looking for out placement and 
possibly trying to set up your own business’.125 The complainant was told 
that ‘graphic design of FMCGs (fast-moving consumer goods) [is] a young 
person’s job’. The complainant did not succeed, as the meeting that took 
place was found to be a professional discussion rather than a job interview. 
Industries such as advertising for multinational corporations epitomise 
consumer society, and are therefore likely to expand; however, if the 
employment trajectory is compressed into a period of six years based on the 
perception that creativity declines with age, this is likely to produce a skills 
shortage, even if experienced workers set up their own companies. Industries 
that dominate the new economy are themselves characterised by limited life 
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expectancy, instability and constant reinvention in order to maintain the 
appearance of youthfulness, high energy and cutting-edge attitudes.  
The privileging of youth functions to exclude older workers, who are 
also considered to be unsuitable because of assumptions about their relations 
with younger workers. This was discovered by a 52-year-old applicant for a 
position as a data integrity officer with a telecommunications company. The 
complainant was asked during the interview how he would feel working 
with someone who was younger than him as a supervisor; it was also 
suggested that he would not fit in with the group dynamics of the workplace. 
He was not offered the position, despite possessing the necessary 
qualifications and extensive experience, as well as being told by two 
members of the selection panel that he had interviewed well.126 Another 
complainant in his mid-thirties was unsuccessful in an application for a 
position as an apprentice electrician because the company ‘was looking for 
someone who hadn’t had a career before’.127 Similarly, a civil engineer over 
fifty who responded to an advertisement for a position was told that the 
company was looking for someone younger, to ‘take over the management 
role’.128  
In McIntyre v Tully,129 a job-seeker with about 35 years’ business 
experience ‘cold called’ a company about the possibility of a position in 
photocopier and technology sales. He claimed that when he rang to arrange 
the appointment, the first thing he was asked by the manager was his age. 
When he refused to answer the question directly, the conversation was 
terminated. The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal ordered that the 
respondent pay $11,000 compensation, but this was overturned by the Court 
of Appeal on the grounds that there was not a position on offer; the situation 
was not covered by the employment provisions of the relevant legislation.130 
However, the company had indicated to a human resources training 
company that it was willing to consider employing a trainee. In the 
postmodern environment where promotion of the self is considered the 
modus operandi for those seeking employment, a restrictive interpretation of 
pre-work has the potential to exclude many job-seekers. If mature-aged 
workers become unemployed, they may experience a downward spiral of 
‘skill atrophy’ as a result of the need to reduce expectations about job status, 
which may ultimately result in premature exit from the workforce.131   
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Youthism and the Aesthetic of Pleasure 
Bauman argues that in a consumer society, work is judged not by its role in 
providing a source of stable identity, but by its capacity to produce an 
aesthetic of pleasure, such as excitement, adventure or happiness. In this 
way, all aspects of life are constructed around consumption: 
The trick is no longer to limit work time to the bare minimum, so 
vacating more space for leisure, but on the contrary to efface 
altogether the line dividing vocation from avocation, job from hobby, 
work from recreation; to lift work itself to the rank of supreme and 
most satisfying entertainment.132 
In the new economy, work may be assessed by its capacity to create 
pleasure, both for the worker and for the consumer. According to this thesis, 
not only has the division between work and non-work been effaced, but that 
between producer and consumer has also dissolved: our value as members of 
society is primarily assessed on the basis of a capacity to consume and to 
promote consumption. Historically, youthfulness has been seen as an 
advantage in positions associated with sales, such as fashion and fast food;133 
however, in the industries dominating the new economy, it has become a 
prerequisite. The shift to an aesthetic of consumption is readily demonstrated 
in an age discrimination case which challenged the use of a competency 
described as ‘Virgin flair’ in its recruitment process.134  
When Virgin Blue entered the Australian airline market in 2000 in the 
wake of the collapse of Ansett Airlines, it engaged in large-scale 
recruitment, actively seeking out ex-Ansett staff. The selection process for 
members of its cabin crews included group assessment of 60 applicants 
simultaneously, with reference to a series of behavioural competencies: 
assertiveness, teamwork, communication and ‘Virgin flair’, which was 
defined as ‘a desire to create a memorable, positive experience for 
customers. The ability to have fun, making it fun for the customer.’135 The 
assessment was made on the basis of the preparation and performance of a 
dramatic routine and conducted by existing members of Virgin staff. From 
over 750 applicants, only one person over the age of 35, who was 36, was 
employed. 
The complaint was made by six women, all over 35 years, who had 
been unsuccessful in their applications for positions with Virgin Airlines, 
despite having had extensive experience working with Ansett. Virgin argued 
that the behavioural competency testing was intended to produce age-neutral 
results, and contended that this was demonstrated in its use in other 
recruitment processes in the company. However, the assessment process was 
conducted by existing members of Virgin Airlines staff, who were all young 
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and had had minimal training in the psychological assessment procedure, 
and no training in assessment of the behavioural competency of ‘Virgin 
flair’. The complainants argued that ‘Virgin Blue encouraged a work culture 
that equated youth and its outward physical manifestations with … the 
ability to have fun – part of the “behavioural competency” of “Virgin 
Flair”’. In determining whether an applicant had the competency as a ‘fun’ 
person, the assessors identified with people who were the same age and had 
the same experience as them, and therefore ‘unconsciously but invariably 
preferred younger people (largely of their own age) to older people’. Expert 
evidence was given before the tribunal, which supported the claim that ‘a 
similar-to-me effect’ could bias a perception, regardless of age.136 
The complainants also contended that the assessment procedure was 
essentially a ‘beauty contest’, ‘an elaborate ruse to mark an intentional 
choice by the assessors of the most physically attractive employees (male or 
female)’.137 They provided evidence of promotional material with images of 
young, attractive women used for the recruitment drive. The preference for 
younger women, particularly in service and administrative support positions 
– historically, the only sources of female employment – has always 
functioned to disadvantage older women, regardless of their level of 
experience. Younger women are preferred because they are considered more 
attractive, and the sexualisation of their bodies is seen to be an asset 
conducive to commercial success. Women are far more likely than men to 
experience ageism associated with their appearance or sexuality, as well as 
being considered to age more quickly than men, such that they may never be 
the right age.138 
Savage SC found that direct and indirect discrimination had occurred, 
and that assessors unconsciously discriminated against the applicants on the 
basis of age. The decision was based on a statistical analysis of the age 
makeup of the workforce selected, resulting in a group selection process that 
did not function as it should have. He awarded damages on the basis of the 
likelihood of the complainants’ success in obtaining employment, if not for 
the discriminatory conduct, to be at least 20 per cent. The Supreme Court 
rejected an appeal, affirming that there had been no errors of law and that 
Virgin Blue had indirectly discriminated against the six complainants. 
Conclusion 
Ageism in employment is a rapidly escalating phenomenon that is unlikely 
to be reversed in the foreseeable future.139 By means of an overview of 
conciliation complaints and reported decisions within a socio-legal 
framework, this article has excavated and interrogated the multiple 
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contradictions besetting age discrimination legislation. We have shown that 
while the legislation may occasionally effect a remedy for individual 
complainants, the model is incapable of addressing the systemic nature of 
ageism and is not intended to do so. As well as embodying the weaknesses 
of the individualised complaint-based model of anti-discrimination 
legislation generally, the ageist peculiarities associated with a postmodern 
work ethic place ageism beyond the limits of anti-discrimination law.  
Because the Australian legislation came into operation just when the 
modernist industrial economy was fragmenting, the statistical bands and the 
ageist assumptions underpinning them have changed. Government policy 
identified a need for greater productivity at work, which included having 
older people work longer. It was anticipated that they would continue in 
their present jobs rather than retire early, or embark on a period of semi-
retirement including part-time work, in which case they would constitute a 
convenient reserve army that could be called upon in times of need and cast 
off when there was a downturn in the economy. While this idea of a flexible 
workforce accorded with the neo-liberal turn, it ignored the revolutionary 
changes that were occurring within the culture of work, including the 
dissolution of the work ethic. The extensive expertise and experience 
possessed by individual older workers began to be treated as passé, as the 
complaints repeatedly show. Not only do employers expect postmodern 
workers to possess skills congruent with the new knowledge economy, they 
are expected to be young and pliant. We have suggested that youthism has 
infused the very nature of work itself. While female embodiment and beauty 
have long been dimensions of women’s work, the idea of work as pleasure is 
a by-product of the cult of youthism that has further blurred the boundary 
between leisure and work, as illustrated by the phenomenon of ‘Virgin flair’. 
Older workers simply do not fit this mould. If they fail to satisfy what have 
become the de facto inherent requirements of the job, they cannot prove age 
discrimination if they complain. 
Instead of constructive intergenerational relationships in the 
workplace,140 whereby older workers help to train younger workers in the 
interests of renewal, we now seem to have a destructive culture of ‘age 
wars’, in which young are set against old and old against young in ways that 
were formerly unimaginable. It may be that this conflictual relationship 
serves a convenient ideological purpose by deflecting attention away from 
the fact that there simply are no longer enough permanent full-time jobs for 
everyone. Precarious and contingent work has become the norm. The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics already plays a role in occluding this reality 
by classifying those who work for one hour per week as ‘employed’, in the 
same way as those who work full-time.141 In light of the uncertain, downsized 
and risky culture of work that we have depicted as the backdrop to 
complaints of ageism, it is difficult to deny the ideological role that age 
discrimination legislation serves. 
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